A treaty under strain
Signed during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s first term, the 1996 treaty brought a measure of stability to India-Bangladesh ties by setting clear guidelines for sharing the Ganga’s waters during the dry season. It provided for alternating 10-day blocks from 11 March to 11 May, giving both countries 35,000 cusecs of water. For flows below 70,000 cusecs, the share was 50:50. When flows touched 70,000 to 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh received 35,000. For anything above that, India took 40,000 and Bangladesh the rest.
But that delicate balance is now under threat.
According an Economic Times report, India is seeking an additional 30,000 to 35,000 cusecs during the same period to meet its own rising needs for irrigation, maintaining Kolkata Port, and powering hydroelectric projects.
Officials quoted by The New Indian Express said New Delhi is not inclined to extend the treaty as is. Instead, India is pushing for a shorter-term agreement, ten to fifteen years instead of thirty, to allow room for periodic revisions.
“Before Pahalgam, we were inclined to extend the treaty for another thirty years, but the situation changed drastically afterwards,” said a senior official at the Ministry of External Affairs to The New Indian Express.
Water, power and precedent
Bangladesh’s vulnerabilities are stark. As a low-lying delta nation, it depends heavily on river systems flowing in from India. The World Bank estimates that agriculture contributes over 11 percent to its GDP and employs nearly 35 percent of its workforce. About 60.5 percent of its land is arable, leaving little scope for agricultural expansion.Bangladesh is effectively “maxed out” on its agricultural footprint. This, therefore, amplifies dependence on efficient water-sharing frameworks.The result: a deep reliance on predictable water flows.
The Ganga and Teesta rivers are lifelines, and any uncertainty over flows is a threat not just to farmers, but to food security and the broader economy.
India’s posture echoes its recent moves with Pakistan. Following the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, which killed 26 people, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a pact that had endured since 1960. Coupled with Operation Sindoor, trade suspension, and the stalling of legal processes around the Kishanganga and Ratle hydropower projects, the message is clear: water is no longer off the table as a means of strategic deterrence.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah recently confirmed to The Times of India that the Indus treaty will not be restored.
This shift has unnerved Dhaka. “With the Ganga Treaty up for renewal next year, India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty could cast doubts on its commitment to water-sharing with Bangladesh,” water expert Nutan Manmohan told The Sunday Guardian.
Uttam Sinha of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, speaking to The Sunday Guardian, warned: “While India has traditionally respected water-sharing arrangements with its lower riparian neighbours… the success of future negotiations will largely depend on the prevailing political climate.”
The chicken neck irony
For years, India’s strategic unease has centred around the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip linking its mainland to the northeast. Often dubbed India’s “chicken neck”, this corridor has been portrayed by some in Dhaka, including Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, as a point of leverage.
Yunus, during his four-day visit to Beijing, stirred controversy by referring to the region as “landlocked” and Bangladesh as its “only guardian of the ocean”.
“The seven states of India, the eastern part of India, are called the seven sisters…They have no way to reach out to the ocean. For Bangladesh, as the only guardian of the ocean in the region, this could be a huge opportunity and an extension of the Chinese economy,” Yunus said, suggesting Bangladesh could act as a conduit for China into India’s east.
“From Bangladesh, you can go anywhere you want. The ocean is our backyard,” Yunus declared.
Now, the tables have turned.
India controls water flow at the Farakka Barrage, just 10 km from the Bangladesh border. Dhaka baited New Delhi with its so-called maritime leverage; India is now returning the favour with its hydrological leverage.
Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma underlined Bangladesh’s own vulnerabilities. “First is the 80-kilometre North Bangladesh Corridor… Any disruption here can isolate Rangpur division. Second is the 28-kilometre Chittagong Corridor… the only direct link between Bangladesh’s economic and political capitals,” Sarma posted on X.
“Bangladesh, like India, is embedded with two ‘chicken necks’. I am only presenting geographical facts that some may tend to forget.”
Transshipment fallout
Further complicating matters is the political upheaval in Dhaka. Sheikh Hasina, long viewed as a reliable partner by Delhi, was ousted in mid-2024 after nearly two decades in power. Her replacement, Muhammad Yunus, who became the chief adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, has shifted the country’s foreign policy posture, drawing it closer to China and Pakistan.
On April 8 2025, India revoked Bangladesh’s access to a key transshipment arrangement that had existed since 2020. The move effectively dismantled a key logistical arrangement that had been in place since June 2020, when India allowed Bangladeshi exporters to use its Land Customs Stations (LCSs) to move cargo to third countries such as Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar via Indian ports and airports.
Designed to lower logistics costs and boost export efficiency, particularly for Bangladesh’s critical ready-made garments (RMG) industry, the arrangement had enabled Dhaka to piggyback on India’s infrastructure for greater global market access.
However, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) circular issued on April 8 rescinded this facilitation. While India’s Ministry of External Affairs clarified that the move “does not impact Bangladesh exports to Nepal or Bhutan transiting through Indian territory”, the decision nonetheless disrupts a major trade lifeline for Dhaka.
The fallout is immediate: increased shipping costs, longer delivery timelines, and reduced competitiveness, especially for air cargo routed through key hubs like Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport.
According to The Daily Star, for Bangladesh, which reported record exports of $50 billion in 2024, driven by an 8.3 percent annual growth in the RMG sector, a 10.44 percent rise in leather exports ($577.29 million), and a 16.32 percent jump in cotton-related goods ($319.06 million), the loss of transshipment privileges threatens to undercut hard-won gains in global trade.
The China factor
Dhaka’s embrace of China is evident.
During his visit to China, Yunus signed agreements on hydrological data-sharing for the Yarlung Zangbo–Jamuna (Brahmaputra) river system and launched FTA discussions. According to a joint statement released after official talks, Dhaka and Beijing also agreed to initiate discussions on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) “at an early date”, signalling a potential economic alignment that could reshape regional trade dynamics.
Talks were even held at the foreign secretary level between Pakistan and Bangladesh, an event nearly unthinkable a few years ago. A Foreign Office Consultation (FOC) was held in Dhaka, with Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Amna Baloch, participating. Additionally, a trilateral meeting between Bangladesh, Pakistan and China was held on 19 June, further highlighting the efforts to foster regional cooperation.
Of particular concern to India is the revival of the World War II-era Lalmonirhat air base, located 12 to 20 km from the Indian border and around 100 km from the Siliguri Corridor.
According to The New Indian Express, Indian intelligence agencies view the development as a “grey zone threat”, citing its potential dual-use for both civilian and military purposes, including surveillance and logistics operations that could directly compromise India’s strategic “chicken neck”.
Further escalating concerns, The Economic Times reports that Chinese officials have visited the Lalmonirhat site, fuelling speculation about Beijing’s involvement in the base’s potential redevelopment, an alarming prospect given its proximity to one of India’s most sensitive and vital corridors.
The persistent Teesta problem
The Teesta River, which flows through both countries, remains a longstanding dispute. Only 121 km of its 414-km stretch lies in Bangladesh, yet it is the fourth-largest river for the country and vital for dry-season irrigation in the north.
In 2011, a near-final agreement was stalled due to opposition from West Bengal’s government. That vacuum gave China an opportunity to step in. As per The New Indian Express, China has committed USD 2.1 billion in loans, investments and grants to Bangladesh, with the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) standing as a focal point in the bilateral relationship.
India fears long-term infrastructure and intelligence encroachments in the sensitive north.
The road ahead
According to the Ministry of Jal Shakti, India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers.
Article XII of the Ganga Treaty states it is “renewable on the basis of mutual consent”. That clause has become India’s pressure point. Whether India walks away entirely or simply rewrites it, the outcome will reflect how far Dhaka has drifted and how willing India is to assert control.
India, as the upper riparian, holds the cards. Bangladesh, facing political flux and strategic overreach, is struggling to defend its interests.
Water may be a shared resource, but in South Asia today, it is increasingly a solitary advantage for those who control its source.
Content Source: economictimes.indiatimes.com