How RIC began and how it went dormant
The RIC framework was first proposed in the late 1990s by former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, envisioning a strategic counterbalance to the unipolarity that followed the Cold War. The logic was straightforward: three large Eurasian powers with significant regional influence could work together to shape a multipolar world order.Through the 2000s and early 2010s, RIC held regular meetings at ministerial and senior official levels. While it never evolved into a military or economic bloc like NATO or the EU, it served as a valuable backchannel and coordination forum—especially on multilateral platforms like the UN and WTO. It also acted as a conceptual forerunner to newer groupings such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
The RIC mechanism gradually fell into disuse for two main reasons. The pandemic led to the suspension of many multilateral forums, and RIC meetings were no exception. In-person diplomacy came to a halt, and virtual summits were largely prioritized for more urgent formats like G20 or BRICS. Secondly, the Galwan Valley clashes in eastern Ladakh in 2020 marked a major downturn in India-China relations. Trust eroded sharply, and any trilateral format involving both countries became politically unviable for New Delhi. Joint work under RIC was effectively frozen, with India unwilling to share a forum with Beijing amid unresolved border issues.
Oil sanctions have become a common pressure point
The West’s response to Russia’s continued military operations in Ukraine has intensified, with renewed secondary sanctions threats — led by US President Donald Trump and NATO – targeting countries that continue to purchase Russian oil. The talk of RIC revival comes right amid threats of sanctions. Interestingly, it is the three RIC countries – Russia, India and China – which are on target because China and India are the biggest buyers of Russian oil. Much before Trump’s threatened secondary sanctions kick in after the grace period, the EU has fired a warning shot. As part of its fresh sanctions package on Russia, the EU has imposed sanctions on the Indian oil refinery Vadinar in which Russian energy giant Rosneft holds a stake and lowered the oil price cap. The European Union’s recent move has sent a clear signal. The West is no longer merely warning but it has intention to act. This shared economic vulnerability is pushing Russia, India and China to reconsider closer coordination. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov put it, the need for “strategic autonomy” and “multipolarity” is more relevant than ever.Can India afford to become part of an anti-West axis?
China’s support for reviving RIC follows a subtle but unmistakable thaw in India-China relations. Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar recently visited China for the SCO Foreign Ministers’ meeting and held bilateral talks with both Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov. Significantly, Dr. Jaishankar also met President Xi Jinping, an indication of top-level political intent to stabilize ties. While New Delhi remains wary of Beijing, both sides understand the limitations of permanent hostility. India wants to avoid a two-front confrontation (with China and Pakistan) while also maintaining room to maneuver in a highly fluid global order. Re-engaging through RIC, even cautiously, fits this appraoch.
There are clear drivers for reviving RIC. These would be counterbalancing Western dominance in sanctions and global rule-making; energy security coordination, especially on payment mechanisms, shipping logistics, and price caps; and promoting multipolarity, where emerging powers like India don’t have to “choose sides” in the US-China competition.
But there are equally strong limitations. The US-India strategic relationship is at an all-time high, covering defense, technology, intelligence-sharing and semiconductors. India is a member of the Quad (with the US, Japan, and Australia) and I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US), and it has growing trade ties with the EU. Importantly, India is unlikely to trust Beijing fully unless there is meaningful progress on the border dispute. RIC cannot function if India sees it merely as a vehicle for Chinese or Russian strategic interests. Full-fledged participation in a revived RIC could be perceived in Washington and Brussels as a tilt toward the Russia-China axis — something New Delhi has carefully avoided even while buying Russian oil.
India’s official statement that any decision on RIC will be taken “in a mutually convenient manner” is telling. It shows New Delhi is not closing the door but is also not walking in without evaluating the consequences. If RIC is revived, it will likely be in a limited and issue-specific format, focusing perhaps on energy coordination, climate policy and regional connectivity. A full-spectrum trilateral strategic alignment is unlikely unless geopolitical conditions change drastically.
The revival of RIC is not merely symbolic. It reflects deeper realignments in a world where traditional alliances are shifting. For Russia and China, it’s about finding solidarity amid sanctions. For India, it’s about preserving space for independent foreign policy when its strategic choices are being limited by Trump and the EU. But RIC’s future will depend on whether the three nations can build mutual trust, and not just over oil, but on the broader canvas . The troika may be reviving, but its path will be cautious, transactional and far from smooth, given the wide cracks that persist in India-China relations and India’s strong ties with the US and major European powers.
Content Source: economictimes.indiatimes.com